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The reader who cannot readily identify the 
meaning of CROC (Croque Monsieur? 
Croque Madame?) in the context of 
European defence can be forgiven. The 
flurry of activity in the EU’s Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since 
2016 has generated a host of new acronyms 
(PESCO, CARD, EDF…), of which the 
CROC, the Crisis Response Operation Core, 
certainly is among the least known. It 
deserves more attention however, for it ought 
to be at the centre of efforts to take 
Permanent Structured Cooperation forward. 
 
The CROC is one of the first batch of PESCO 
projects announced in 2017. Its aim is to facilitate 
force-generation for expeditionary operations. 
The initial Franco-German food-for-thought 
paper on the CROC (September 2017) was very 
ambitious: it aimed at a force package of 1 
division or 3 brigades plus the required strategic 
enablers, as a first step towards the EU’s 
Headline Goal, which it translated into the need 
for a corps headquarters, 3 divisions and 9 to 12 
brigades.  
 
EU Member States have been claiming to be 
pursuing the 1999 Headline Goal, the ability to 
deploy a corps of 60,000, for twenty years now. 
In reality, many have come to see it as an 
unrealistic level of ambition, though why that 
should be so, given that the EU-28 pay 1.5 
million men and women to wear uniform, is not 
clear. The Franco-German vision for the CROC 
seemed to be taking the Headline Goal serious 
again, in line with the view that the aim of 
PESCO should be to arrive at “a coherent full 
spectrum force package”. Their food-for-thought 
paper did not propose, however, to identify and 
assign units to the CROC, hence the added value 
to the existing Headline Goal process appeared 
limited. The EU’s Force Catalogue already lists 
theoretically available capabilities without 
identifying units, rendering an assessment of their 
actual readiness impossible. 
 
BATTALION, BRIGADE, CORPS  
The CROC now joins together Cyprus, France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain. Their implementation 
study (January 2019) provides for the 
development of a set of possible and probable 
crisis scenarios, each of which will give rise to a 
Contingency Operation Plan, from which a Force 
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Element List with specific military capability 
needs will be derived. The participating Member 
States are to report the capabilities that they have 
that fulfil these requirements. The aim is not to 
create a stand-by force or to maintain a certain 
state of readiness, but since these capabilities 
would be pre-identified, this should accelerate 
force generation when it is decided to mount an 
actual operation. Furthermore, as a future step, 
command and control options should also be 
pre-identified.  
 
Pre-identification of units is a plus compared to 
the overall Headline Goal process. But the major 
caveat is that the implementation study envisages 
no more than a brigade-size force plus enablers.  
 
This low level of ambition is symptomatic of the 
state of Europe’s armed forces and of the 
absence of strategic vision. During the Cold War, 
the building-bloc of our combined force 
structure was the corps. Even the smaller nations 
such as Belgium contributed a national corps, 
which took its place in the line and was supported 
by the multinational NATO command structure 
and specific multinational assets (such as the 
AWACS). Today, for most European states a 
mere battalion already counts as a major 
deployment. Often, governments even think in 
terms of just companies or half-companies. This 
is how the EU Battlegroup, a battalion-size force, 
has come to dominate the picture of European 
defence.  
 
I am not proposing to reintroduce conscription, 
of course, and to recreate the 1st Belgian Corps 
in Germany. What I am firmly stating is that a 
brigade cannot be the level of ambition for a 
multinational CROC, for the individual nations 
already mount brigades (as the table at the end of 
this paper shows). Belgium alone fields a 
motorised brigade (and, according to NATO, 
should actually add a second, mechanised one). A 
brigade, therefore, must be the smallest national 
building-block towards the constitution of a 
multinational corps, in order to finally achieve the 
Headline Goal – not just on paper, in a theoretical 
catalogue, but in reality. 
 
A CORPS AS THE CORE   
The debate on PESCO (and the European 
Defence Fund) mostly focuses on projects to 
develop new platforms and systems. The purpose 
of these projects, to equip a “coherent full 
spectrum force package”, has been lost from 
view.1  Yet it is essential to achieving the EU’s 
level of ambition. If the Member States use 
PESCO only to collectively procure equipment 
for their national forces, they will for sure save 
money, but their mostly small individual forces 
will not become much more employable, for lack 
of scale and lack of enablers. The latter can only 
be generated in numbers that make a difference 
if a large group of states pool their efforts.  
 
The key to enhancing the readiness of our armed 
forces is to constitute a multinational force 
package, with the brigade as a building block: a 
corps-sized CROC.  
 
First, a smaller nation can field a brigade by itself, 
but lacks the scale to provide all of the required 
combat support and combat service support 
units. In the framework of the CROC, a 
combination of integration and specialisation can 
be organised. In some support areas, nations can 
merge their capabilities into permanently 
integrated multinational support units. In others, 
a division of labour can be established with the 
national support units provided by one nation 
supporting the brigades of the others as well.2  As 
a result, all brigades will be more usable, in more 
scenarios, then when they have to rely on national 
support only.  
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Second, in the framework of the CROC the 
participating states can harmonize equipment and 
doctrine, in order to achieve maximum synergies 
and effects of scale, and launch other PESCO 
projects to that end. There is, for example, space 
for only one future main battle tank in Europe, 
which should at the very least equip all armoured 
brigades in the CROC.  
 
Third, the CROC can serve as the benchmark to 
quantify the need for strategic enablers: the corps 
is the minimum scale at which the EU should 
achieve autonomy in expeditionary operations. If 
necessary, EU Member States should be able to 
deploy the CROC without having to rely on any 
non-European assets in any capability area.   
 
In other words, the CROC can be the central 
PESCO project, which serves as a guiding 
framework for the others. It is the translation into 
reality of the Headline Goal, to which the other 
PESCO projects can be tailored. 
 
THE BENELUX, EI2, AND THE CROC 
The German-Netherlands Corps is an example of 
far-reaching integration between land forces. 
Belgium and France have just launched the CaMo 
Project (for Capacité Motorisée), which will see at 
least equally far-reaching integration of the 
Belgian motorised brigade with the French 
Armée de Terre.  
 
Both Belgium and the Netherlands already 
participate in France’s European Intervention 
Initiative (EI2), launched in 2018 with the aim of 
increasing the capacity of the now 10 members to 
act together.4  Concretely, participating states opt 
to join one or more working groups (such as on 
the Sahel, the Baltic, the Caribbean, power 
projection, or terrorism) in order to forge a prior 
common understanding of the potential joint 
action that they might undertake if a crisis occurs 
in one of these areas. Put differently, in EI2 
France hopes to create a pool of able and willing 
partners to build ad hoc coalitions for French-led 
military interventions.  
 
The link with the CROC is obvious: it is the 
understanding on likely scenarios for intervention 
forged in EI2 that ought to inform the 
Contingency Operation Plans for the CROC. 
These will be much more ambitious than the 
areas mentioned in the CROC implementation 
study, which proposes to focus only on 
humanitarian assistance, non-combatant 
evacuation, protecting lines of communication 
and critical resources (which is more ambitious) 
and conflict prevention (with battlegroup-size 
forces). Governments may wish that they will 
only ever face less threatening scenarios, but it is 
the probable scenarios that we will be obliged to 
deal with, not those that we would like to deal 
with, that should determine the composition of 
the coherent full spectrum force package.  
 
It would make sense, therefore, that the Benelux 
countries (for the armed forces of Luxembourg 
are closely integrated with those of Belgium) and 
the other members of EI2 that are willing to 
contribute at least a brigade, join the CROC. Vice 
versa, Italy, as a key member of the CROC, ought 
to join EI2. 
 
THE CROC, NATO, AND THE EU 
As the Baltic focus of one of the EI2 working 
groups and the launching of PESCO projects on 
intra-European military mobility and on main 
battle tanks prove, the various new European 
defence initiatives are not only about 
expeditionary operations. Already today, PESCO 
is de facto being understood as addressing the 
armed forces of the participating states in their 
entirety, with the aim of collectively achieving 
both the EU and NATO levels of ambition in an 
integrated manner, for territorial defence and 
expeditionary operations.  
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NATO planning envisages 3 army corps. The 
CROC could be one of those. It would be the 
corps on which the EU objective of strategic 
autonomy would centre: ready to take its place in 
the line alongside the non-EU NATO allies in 
case of an Article 5 scenario, but as ready to be 
deployed on expeditionary operations outside the 
EU relying only on the assets of the participating 
states, or to act to protect Europe in case the 
mutual defence guarantee of Article 42.7 of the 
Treaty on European Union is activated. The 
CROC could thus comprise both heavy 
armoured brigades and more rapidly deployable 
motorised brigades.5  This would allow all current 
participants in EI2 to contribute fully to the 
CROC as well if they so wish.6   
 
CONCLUSION: DON’T YIELD TO PESCO-
PESSIMISM 
Thinking on the CROC currently focuses on land 
forces and the required enablers. But it is obvious 
that similar schemes are possible, and necessary, 
for Europe's naval and air forces as well, which 
should be added to the CROC. Moreover, a fully 
operational CROC will require the guaranteed 
availability of a standing joint command 
structure, including for scenarios in which the 
Europeans deploy alone, without non-EU allies.  
 
If we want European defence to advance, we 
should be truly ambitious. There is no point in 
announcing grand multinational initiatives that in 
terms of  the level of ambition do not look 
beyond what its individual members should 
already be capable of today. Similarly, every 
initiative that brings together a subset of the EU-
28 should be truly integrative from the start. 
Otherwise one might as well stay within the 
purely intergovernmental framework of the 
CSDP.  
 
Yielding to PESCO-pessimism is easy, but also 
dangerous. Do we really need more convincing 
of the fact that nobody, not even the US, will 
defend our interests for us? That is why the 
PESCO-realists must be PESCO-optimists. 
 
Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop, an Honorary Fellow 
of the European Security and Defence 
College (ESDC), lectures at Ghent 
University and heads the Europe in the 
World programme at the Egmont – Royal 
Institute for International Relations.  
 
This paper is based on intense discussions 
with military officers and academics from a 
wide range of EU Member States and EU 
and NATO institutions. The author thanks 
all of them, as well as Dr. Bastian Giegerich 
and the International Institute of Strategic 
Studies (IISS) for providing the data for the 
table. 
 
 
TABLE 
Brigade Formations in the EU-28 
Armoured 7 
Mechanised Infantry 22 
Infantry 36 
Light Infantry 5 
Paratroop / Air Mobile / Rapid Reaction 14 
Marine Infantry 3 
Mountain 6 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 This aim was provisionally stated in the 13 November 2017 Notification Document, in which Member States 
announced their intention to activate PESCO, but it was already dropped from the 8 December 2017 Council 
Decision that launched PESCO. 
2 Belgian-Dutch naval cooperation is an existing example of such organisation in the maritime domain: ships sail 
under the national flag with a national crew, but support functions are either binational or provided by one 
nation for both.  
3 This includes the digitalisation and the integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into our militaries. In AI overall, 
Europe can obviously not afford several national projects: if it doesn’t want to fall even further behind in this 
crucial field, there will have to be an integrated EU effort. Similarly, it would make sense for our armed forces to 
integrate the military applications of digitalisation  and AI from the start, via the CROC, instead of launching 
separate national initiatives. 
4 Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the UK. 
5 One could imagine two cores within the CROC, one focusing more on territorial defence and the other on 
expeditionary operations. 
6 The UK would likely remain reticent to join such an integrated scheme, but could ensure that its own 
expeditionary forces in particular are interoperable with the CROC, along the lines of its current cooperation 
with France in the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) and with Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden in the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). 
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